The Project: The Risky Business of Communicating Dissent in Franco’s Spain, Estado Novo Portugal, and the Colonels’ Greece in the 1960s and 1970s.
The excerpts below come from my 55-page senior thesis that I researched, wrote, and edited while I was a student at Yale University. I received a grade of A on the thesis and a BA in History. My thesis advisor was Dr. Konstantina Maragkou.
Excerpt 1 (Page 3-4):
Spain, Portugal, and Greece, today usually grouped together for their economic woes, share another feature: a recent history of dictatorship. Only 40 years ago, all three still suffered under fascist regimes that restricted dissent through brutal repression. As opposition movements struggled to combat these oppressive regimes, they turned to subversive tactics. Since then, methods have evolved along with technology, but recent events in North Africa have shown that the same principles of resistance remain applicable.
Key to effective resistance, aside from support within the military and the international community, are the ability to communicate with other dissidents while eluding capture, and the establishment of strategies that limit the impact of government repression.
Resistance groups in Spain, Portugal, and Greece structured themselves accordingly, avoiding government attention while obtaining international sympathy–and showing sympathetic compatriots that resistance existed. Despite internal strife, particularly over ideology and methods, and limited interaction between organizations, opposition groups that survived utilized similar methods to protect their networks to the greatest extent possible under the circumstances.
The internal communications of the opposition in Greece, Portugal, and Spain are now available, revealing methods of resistance common to all three countries–and even cross-country collaboration–as well as tactics specific to particular groups. Documents detail training, clandestine operations, and internal disputes. They also indicate an awareness of the importance of world politics to the outcome of opposition struggles, in addition to a keen interest in developments in the other European fascist dictatorships.
These materials, along with personal testimonies available online, illuminate key aspects of resistance operations, particularly how dissidents chose to communicate. Perhaps because of the wide range of languages used in these documents, most comparisons of Greece, Spain, and Portugal rely instead on material intended for an international audience. However, the detailed records kept by resistance movements offer valuable insights into the evolution of opposition against the dictatorships and the tactics that, in the face of brutal repression, enabled groups to communicate anti-regime sentiments to each other, to fellow citizens, and even to the international community.
Excerpt 2 (Page 6-7):
Portugal
In the late 1960s, “over the course of seven days…the time dedicated by…RTP [Radio Television Portugal] to electoral ads of the regime and…of the opposition [was]…59 minutes and 50 seconds for…the government, 6 minutes and one second for the opposition.”18 Additionally, opposition candidates had to make their statements carefully: “the police initiated criminal proceedings (10/8/69) against candidate Maria Barroso for remarks about Portugal’s colonial wars.”19 Given the overwhelming power of the state, people risked arrest or exile for comments and actions, whether in the context of campaigns or regular conversation, that could be construed as against the regime–or against the colonial wars.20
Portugal devoted many of its resources to trying to crush armed independence movements in its African colonies21 after active, armed struggles began in Angola in 1961, Guinea-Bissau in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964.22 These anti-colonial struggles, together with continued resentment against the regime, provided the impetus for a clandestine group within the military, known as the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), to begin plotting to overthrow the dictatorship.23
The Portuguese felt the effects of war as soldiers were deployed in greater numbers to the colonies. During the 1969 election campaign, believing the Caetano regime willing to relax its grip on Portugal and its colonial possessions, the opposition tried to mobilize support, demanding the colonial issue be resolved. They soon became disillusioned, realizing that the regime had no intention of relinquishing power, either at home or in Africa.
Unbeknownst to regime leadership, however, a conspiracy had formed within the military itself; unlike past coup plots, this one escaped detection until after its successful implementation on 25 April 1974. Many members of the MFA began discussing anti-regime ideas while serving in Africa — perhaps a consequence of the regime’s decision to “use the war as a threat,” making “misbehavior…a justification for forced enlistment,” which backfired when dissident ideas spread among soldiers.24 The Lisbon government would not only fail to retain the colonies but also, after decades of suppressing opposition, be forced from power in the face of widespread domestic and international opposition.
18 Lino de Carvalho, 1969: Um Marco, 84
19 American Committee on Africa, “Bring the Troops Home from the Azores Too!,” (New York, probably 1969), South African Apartheid Collection, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
20 Ibid.
21 Dossier Sur les Colonies Portugaises: Analyse d’une Lutte de Liberation, 2nd ed., (Brussels: Editions Vie Ouvriere, 1971), 68-69
22 Miguel Cardina, “On Student Movements in the Decay of the Estado Novo,” Portuguese Journal of Social Science 7, no. 3 (2008), 158.
23 Stanley Plastirik, “Portugal’s Dangling Revolution,” Dissent 22, no. 4 (1975), 333.
24 Cardina, “On Student Movements,” 159.
Excerpt 3 (Page 23 -24):
Greece
Like the Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships, the Colonels had repressed free speech, targeted dissidents, imposed strict censorship on the media, and used force against opponents; many fled, and communication suffered. Under martial law, “criticis[ing] the government” merited up to five years in prison.139 Dissidents risked imprisonment, torture, and even murder.140 Exile Olga Dritzou-Kolovou pleaded to other expatriate dissidents on behalf of her brother, worrying that, “like on analogous cases the authorities…have not announced his arrest, in order to hide the probable…assassination.”141 Helen Vlachos, a journalist and newspaper publisher under house arrest in Greece (she later escaped) for criticizing the regime to foreign newspapers,142 wrote of a visit from a relative, who informed her, ‘“if you don’t give in, they have decided to…eliminate you.”’143
That threat proved to be false, but for those who were not well-known, voicing dissent was dangerous, and few denounced the regime publicly. Even Mikis Theodorakis, famous composer and politician, was imprisoned in Oropos Concentration Camp in October 1969.144 Despite the risks, many found ways to express themselves — secretly, at least.
For dissidents in Greece, criticizing the regime was “not safe at all, but…necessary,”145 and dissidents who lived abroad tried to give those within Greece means to declare their opposition.
Domestically, the Junta provoked further opposition through systematic abuses and purges of potential opponents. The regime caused resentment by ousting–and, oftentimes, arresting–members of the military, media, university faculties, and other state-controlled occupations who incurred government disapproval. On the loyalty questionnaire, applicants were asked about any affiliations past or present with ‘“the Greek Communist Party, the Committee for World Peace and Detente or the Bertrand Russell Committee,”’ and if they had ‘“ever taken part in a ‘Peace March’ or attended a meeting at which anti-national or communist slogans were used.”’146
Additionally, they had to denounce the ‘“Greek Communist Party and its various organizations.”’147 The regime defined many opposition groups as “organizations” of the Greek Communist Party; they also periodically dismissed people “who [did] not think like” them.148 People lost their jobs for a range of reasons, such as being ‘“of extreme left-wing views,’” or having left-wing acquaintances.149 Consequently, the regime created a class of unemployed people who had grievances and free time. Furthermore, the disincentive of arrest, torture, and prison lost impact with each arbitrary arrest; even after supposed reforms, Greeks could “be arrested any minute.”’150 Clandestine groups of dissidents from a variety of political persuasions organized to plot against the dictatorship within Greece.151
139 “Athenian,” Inside the Colonels’ Greece, 76.
140 Olga Dritzou-Kolovou, “Appeal,” March or April 1969, The Solaro Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University.
141 Ibid.
142 Helen Vlachos, House Arrest, (Boston: Gambit Incorporated, 1970), 175.
143 Ibid, 53.
144 T.M., Letter to Antonio Solaro, 21 Oct. 1969, The Solaro Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University.
145 Helen Vlachos, ed., Free Greek Voices: A Political Anthology, (London: Doric Publications Ltd., 1971), 1.
146 “MaCarthy-ite Quiz for Greek Government Employees,” Le Monde, 24 Aug 1967, translator unknown. League for Democracy in Greece (Modern Greek Archive), Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London.
147 Ibid.
148 Athenian, Inside the Colonels’ Greece, 83.
149 Ibid, 82.
150 Louisa? [signature illegible], “Report of Visit to Greece, February 27 to March 1, 1972,” 4. League for Democracy in Greece (Modern Greek Archive), Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London.
151 “Athenian,” Inside the Colonels’ Greece, 136-138.
Excerpt 4 (Page 44-47):
Spain
Basque resistance gained notoriety for militancy, widespread operations, and frequent mobilization. Throughout Basque Country, dissidents set about “eluding the Civil Guard and the Armed Police…acquiring the habit of checking if one was followed, refraining from asking the names of those who gave them information, delivered a clandestine newspaper, or served as a link to contact others.”303 Many Basques engaged in daring resistance, leaving a “Basque flag to wave in the center of Bilbao,” posting signs for ‘“Gora Euzkadi’” and “‘EGI,’” and writing “‘S’ on “walls and rocks” to “commemorate, under the nose of the oppressor, the birth of Sabino Arana.”304
The police retaliated by arresting suspected opposition members. Five Basques, “convicted…for…the crime of illegal propaganda,” received fines of 10,000 pesetas each and prison sentences of up to three years.305 Three other activists received sentences for “unauthorized demonstration,” for participating in a September 1967 protest — against detentions — at which some demonstrators “scream[ed] subversive” statements.306
…
Those running propaganda operations for EGI within Spain followed procedures like those in spy films, providing addresses of mailboxes or other locations and informing “whoever comes with the propaganda” to ask for a certain person and follow a certain procedure “to signal” their identity.318
One such set of instructions told the recipient to go to a particular café, carry a newspaper, “and drink wine,” at which point a “person will approach and say” a particular phrase, to be followed by further instructions once the letter’s recipient gave the designated counter-phrase (the letter also included a reminder to burn it).319 In other cases, they left material within designated mailboxes for agents to pick up later.320
If a location risked compromise, district leaders assigned new drop locations, notifying their partners of the change;321 they usually separated the information over multiple letters as a security measure. Of course, sometimes leaders could not send the letters immediately, in which case they had to find other means to move material. One sent a “trusted person…name unknown,” to deliver the material.322
To disseminate propaganda, members employed elaborate methods, including coded phone conversations, that varied depending on location and quantity of copies to distribute.323 They were responsible for over 1000 illegal publications per region, and close to 5000 in some areas.324 Nonetheless, leaders warned those “in imminent danger” while in possession of propaganda to “dispose of it,” listing answers members ought to give to particular questions in order to mislead police and protect the organization if captured.325
Instructions for recruits emphasized “above all…discipline, discretion, vigilance.”326
303 Juan Miguel de Mora, “Con la Resistencia Vasca [With the Basque Resistance],” Gudari. Exact date unknown (between 1965 and 1975). Accessed at Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.
304 Ibid.
305 “Condenas del Tribunal de Orden Publico por Poropaganda Ilegal, [Condemned by Public Order Tribunal for Illegal Propaganda],” Pueblo Vasco, 27 June 1969. Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.
306 Ibid.
318 Zumele (pseudo.), Correspondence (1969-76). EBB-175-4, Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.
319 Kontxesi 75-7 (pseudo.), Correspondence (1969-76). EBB-175-4, Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.
320 Zumele (pseudo.), Letter marked 1-4, Correspondence (1969-76). EBB-175-4, Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.
321 Zumele (pseudo.), Letter (marked 1-5), in Correspondence (1969-76). EBB-175-4, Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.
322 Kontxesi, 75-7, Correspondence (1969-76). EBB-175-4, Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.
323 Kontxesi, 75-3, Correspondence (1969-76). EBB-175-4, Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid
326 “Normas Para los Resistentes Vascos,” originally in Amayur, 16 January 1971. EGI-346-1, Archive of the Basque National Party (PNV), Sabino Arana Foundation.